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This project aims to identify poor human factors design decisions that led to error-prone systems, or did not 
facilitate the flight crew making the right choices; and to verify that NASA is effectively preventing similar incidents 
from occurring again.  This analysis was performed by reviewing significant incidents and close calls in human 
spaceflight identified by the NASA Johnson Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance Flight Safety Office.  The 
review of incidents shows whether the identified human errors were due to the operational phase (flight crew and 
ground control) or if they initiated at the design phase (includes manufacturing and test).  This classification was 
performed with the aid of the NASA Human Systems Integration domains.  This in-depth analysis resulted in a tool 
that helps with the human factors classification of significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight, which 
can be used to identify human errors at the operational level, and how they were or should be minimized.  Current 
governing documents on human systems integration for both government and commercial crew were reviewed to see 
if current requirements, processes, training, and standard operating procedures protect the crew and ground control 
against these issues occurring in the future.  Based on the findings, recommendations to target those areas are 
provided. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENTS TOOL 
 
The Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human 
Spaceflight graphic in Figure 1 presents a visual 
overview of major losses and close calls throughout the 
history of human spaceflight.   The chart focuses 
primarily on those incidents that happened with crewed 
missions for suborbital, orbital, and lunar missions.  The 
incidents are organized by flight phase: those occurring 
in ground, during launch, flight (ascent and descent), 
entry, landing, and post-landing.  Each box includes the 
name of the mission, date in which the incident 
occurred, and a brief description.  The colors of the 
boxes signify the types of events: loss of crew (red), 
crew injury (light orange), and related or recurring 
events (yellow).  This chart was created and is currently 
maintained by the NASA Johnson Space Center Safety 
and Mission Assurance Office.  It was put together with 
the purpose of providing awareness of the risks inherent 
in human spaceflight, and to encourage continued 
vigilance for current and new missions.  It is a tool for 
sharing lessons learned to prevent future tragedies [1]. 
 
This graphic led to the development of an interactive 
tool where the user can click on provided 
classifications, such as the type of event, human error, 
vehicles, country, systems, and lessons learned [2].  
These classifications allow a user to narrow down the 
incidents, and then click on the interested event to see a 
slide with more information about the incident, with 
links to references.  This interactive tool was used to 
perform an in-depth analysis from a Human Systems 
Integration (HSI) perspective, looking at human error 
occurring in the operational phase [3,4].  From there, we 
were able to derive classifications of human error and 
provide recommendations that will be discussed in the 
next sections. 
II. ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS 
IN HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 
 
II.I. Assumptions for Analysis 
Human error can occur anywhere in a System of 
Systems.  For example, an error in software code is also 
a human error since a human is the one developing it.  
Similarly, an error in the process is also a human error 
given that humans were the ones creating the process 
[4].  However, to scope this analysis, the following 
assumptions were made: 
 
a) Human errors included in this analysis were cases 
when the errors led to an incident or close call. 
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b) Although everything can be attributed to human 
error at some point, this classification focuses on 
human error at the operational level, and whether it 
was a design-induced error.  Design-induced errors 
occur when the task or action did not meet its 
intended function due to design issues. 
c) All medical evacuations are described as being due 
to medical conditions. Private health information is 
unavailable for this study and we cannot be sure 
whether the medical condition was caused by 
design-induced error or operational error. 
d) EVA incident summaries were excluded from this 
review as they are documented in a separate graphic 
called “Significant Incidents and Close Calls in 
Human Spaceflight: EVA Operations” [5]. 
 
II.II. Description of Analysis 
The in-depth exploration of the significant incidents 
related to human error was performed using Microsoft 
Excel, in which a table was created to address different 
factors for this analysis.  This file can be used as a tool 
to easily search for lessons learned related to human 
factors.  If users want to investigate further a particular 
incident, they can follow up with the Significant 
Incidents tool with incorporated recommendations made 
in this paper.  The tabs included are (shown in Figure 
2): 
- Project Summary 
- Assumptions 
- Classification 
- To-add SpaceShip 2 
- To-add EVA 23 
- Recommendations for Tool Updates 
 
 
Fig. 2: Screenshot of Excel file showing tabs of 
Classification Tool 
The first two tabs are introductory items for the user 
that include a project description and high level 
summary of findings.  The Classification tab is 
explained in the next section.  The tabs with To-add 
Spaceship2, and To-add EVA23 provide a summary of 
findings and references for these two main events that 
did not make it to the Significant Incidents tool.  The 
last tab includes general recommendations for tool 
updates, and these will be described in a later section. 
 
The Classification tab contains most of the 
information relevant to this analysis.  The full list is 
Fig. 1. Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight (NASA, 2015) [1]. 
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shown in Appendix A: Requirements addressing 
significant incidents with design-induced and 
operational errors.  It is divided into the following 6 
parts. 
 
1. Incident Description: Provides the mission name, 
date, type, and short description.  This description 
varies from the one given in the Significant 
Incidents tool, as it pertains mainly to the human 
factors aspect of the incident. 
 
2. Human Errors (Classification): This 
classification answers the following questions: 
o Did the Significant Incidents tool flag the incident 
as human error? 
o Should it have been flagged as such or does it need 
to be changed? 
o Were the human errors at operational level design-
induced or operational errors? 
o Were the identified human errors at operational 
level the primary cause or contributing factors to 
the incident or close call? 
 
3. Human Factors Design: For those incidents where 
human factors design was the primary cause or a 
contributing factor, poor human factors design 
decisions that led either to an error-prone system or 
did not facilitate crew making the right choices 
were identified. 
 
4. HSI Discipline Responsible: Each incident is 
assigned to at least one NASA HSI discipline.  
Given that HSI operates as part of the Systems 
Engineering System of Systems, each incident 
corresponds to at least one domain [4].  HSI 
domains are added as the responsible groups that 
need to ensure current and future missions are 
addressing the incident’s issue.  These groups may 
not necessarily be involved in the design itself, but 
are responsible for asking the right questions during 
their participation in preliminary design reviews, 
critical design reviews, test readiness reviews, or 
other systems engineering reviews throughout the 
lifecycle of a mission, so as to prevent them from 
becoming incidents or close calls again. 
 
5. Recommendations: This section includes 
recommended updates for the interactive tool for a 
particular incident, and recommended actions that 
could have been done during the design, 
operational, or training phases to prevent the 
incident from occurring. 
 
6. Review of Documents: Requirements in four main 
documents were reviewed as a way to ensure we in 
fact have learned our lesson, and appropriate 
requirements addressing these incidents in human 
spaceflight were incorporated [6,7,8,9].  Those 
include: 
o NASA-STD 3001 Volume 2 
o NASA SP-2010-3407 Handbook 
o MPCV 70024 HSIR 
o CCT-REQ-1130 
These documents were chosen as they cover current 
crew modules in development.  This section of the 
tool also includes a ‘recommendations for 
documents’ column in case some of those 
requirements need to be clarified or added. 
 
II.III. Human Factors Classification of Significant 
Incidents 
 
The developed Microsoft Excel file shows the 
Human Factors Classification of Significant Incidents 
and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight.  The tool shows 
the six parts that were described in the previous section.  
Here we will describe insights to the classification with 
the use of a few examples. 
 
The first assessment made was for those events that 
were classified as ‘human error’ in the Significant 
Incidents tool.  As mentioned earlier, the graphic and 
tool were prepared by the Safety and Mission Assurance 
group with no participation of the Habitability and 
Human Factors group, which is the group that mainly 
deals with the minimization of human error for crew 
tasks.  This analysis was an attempt to fill that gap.  The 
intent was to verify that these events were actually 
human error at the operational level. 
 
During the analysis we realized that perhaps the 
term ‘human error’ was not appropriate for these 
classifications.  There were a couple of instances that 
were classified as human error, yet these were design-
induced errors.  One was for Soyuz TM-25 that dealt 
with landing rockets being fired at heat shield separation 
instead of at landing.  During the conceptual phase, this 
design should have accounted for possible 
environmental conditions, such as high humidity levels 
in the atmosphere that may affect the connectors.  In 
other cases, the events were not flagged as human error 
but should have been, so a change is recommended for 
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those cases.  For example, Apollo-Soyuz Test Project 
(ASTP) caused a crew injury that happened with the 
Earth Landing System auto/manual when switching 
back to auto.  In this case, the displays did not have a 
visual cue for the pilot to realize that he was still 
operating in manual mode.  This was a poor human 
factors design decision that did not facilitate the 
crewmember to make the right choice. 
 
Therefore, the recommendation for the interactive 
tool is to change this classification to “design-induced 
error” (pertaining to direct interfaces of human and 
equipment), and “operational error” (pertaining to 
human error as opposed to hardware or software 
operational malfunction). 
 
Once this classification was done, NASA HSI 
domains related to the incident were added.  Those 
included Human Factors Engineering, Training, 
Maintainability and Supportability, Habitability and 
Environment, Operations Resources, and Safety.  For 
example, the Mir Progress M-24 collision occurred 
during the second docking attempt.  The primary cause 
was human factors design, as there was a failure of 
control equipment in the software design.  The domains 
involved are Human Factors Engineering (usability 
evaluations of the software could have been helpful), 
Systems Safety (quality assurance to minimize risk 
personnel was needed), and Training (more ground 
simulations could have helped). 
 
In many of the incidents, there were several factors 
acting either as causes to the incident or as a 
consequence of the first incident; in both cases they 
contributed to the failure.  Those are documented in the 
column of “other causes synergistic in causing the 
failure”.  Main observations from this part of the tool 
are summarized in the next two points: 
 
 Many synergistic causes are process related 
o We tend to overestimate the ability of processes to 
catch problems. 
o The speed of a human’s thought process is 
overestimated (one crewmember may take more 
time to think about a way to proceed). 
o We need to understand flaws in the process and 
how they propagate. 
o Make changes to the process as needed. 
 
 Training 
o It is hard to assess the best way to train; we need 
to have specific metrics to verify that something 
was learned. 
o For any training there is a list of tasks and some 
requirements; if you can show you did the task, it 
is complete. What if the person did not go through 
that one event during the on the job training (OJT) 
time to show that he/she is capable of handling it; 
how is that measured? 
o In spaceflight, OJT is hard to assess, as we cannot 
account for every possible scenario.  Human 
judgment leads one to follow procedures except 
when it is unsafe. 
 
II.IV. Recommendations for Significant Incidents 
and Preventive Measures 
 
The Human Factors Classification of Significant 
Incidents tool contains a recommendations section, 
which includes updates for the Significant Incidents tool 
that are specific to each incident; and preventive 
measures during design, training, and operational phases 
to avoid the incident.  For example, Soyuz TM-5 close 
call was acknowledged to be a combination of incorrect 
actions of the crew commander and mission control 
personnel.  Since this was related to training, the 
recommendation for preventive measures was to 
provide appropriate training to crewmembers, and to 
perform more ground simulations of possible burns.  
The recommendation for the tool itself was to add a 
reference that includes this close call report, add a 
specific root cause and how the event was addressed in 
later flights. 
 
The SpaceShipTwo (SS2) loss of crew incident had 
minimum information, which may be due to it being a 
recent event during the last update of the Significant 
Incidents tool.  The recommendations include several 
sources that detailed the findings from the investigation 
report.  In addition, a separate tab was created in the 
Excel file called “To add – SpaceShip2”, which has a 
summary of the findings of the SS2 accident based on 
the above sources.  These can be found in Appendix B.  
Recommended preventive measures include: 
 
a) During the requirements development, it is necessary 
to include the participation and authority of a human 
factors expert in the lifecycle of the mission. 
b) During the design phase, use a HSI approach and do 
not use the operator as a single-point failure or the 
responsible party for fixing a known possible design 
issue. 
c) During the operational phase, use the buddy system, 
also known as error trapping, for executing steps. 
This should even be part of the procedures.  
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Summarizing the findings from other incidents and 
close calls, the following mission lifecycle 
recommendations are provided: 
 
1) Automation can be a big aid to managing human 
errors during flight missions.  Designers of advanced 
tools will need to ensure whether they are going for 
effectiveness or efficiency in the tasks they want to 
see accomplished by the operator.  Given that 
automatic tools can help minimize errors, it can also 
prompt the user to get distracted with other 
activities.  A human-centric design for spaceflight 
needs to provide functionality to astronauts while 
addressing their individual needs [10]. 
 
2) Many human errors are found in the manufacturing 
operations phase because proactive steps are not 
considered during the design phase.  Workload must 
be better planned and distributed, leaving sufficient 
time for manufacturing operations to reduce work 
pressures, stress, and fatigue.  If there are 
organizational changes, management needs to clearly 
explain the changes in the organization structure, 
people’s new roles, procedures, and all which could 
affect normal manufacturing operations [11]. 
 
3) Crew Resource Management (CRM) is the effective 
use of all available resources: human resources 
(people), hardware (technology), and information 
(process) (FAA AC120-51E, 2004) [12].  As 
observed in the analysis, the most frequent causes 
for human error at the operational level included 
fatigue, complacency, lack of attention, unclear 
directions, and organizational restructure [13].  Most 
CRM techniques are successfully being used in the 
aviation industry.  They include organizational 
factors, decision making, leadership, 
communication, teamwork, workload planning and 
distribution, and training.  CRM provides a set of 
skills that can be applied for better error detection 
and efficient error management [14].  Although 
human spaceflight applies some of these concepts, it 
would help to follow the structure these techniques 
provide.  HSI covers these concepts through the 
NASA domains. 
 
4) Increase participation of the manufacturing group in 
early stages with derivation of requirements, design 
reviews, drawings, and test plans to identify and 
address risk for error proactively. 
 
5) Early testing at the element or subsystem levels to 
minimize risk for errors during assembly and test of 
the entire system. 
 
6) Decomposition of requirements into many 
specifications can create more confusion if not 
written clearly. 
 
7) Even when the same drawings or procedures of a 
legacy/heritage program are used, there is no 
guarantee the same results will be obtained for 
follow-on missions. Materials, technology, 
equipment, techniques, and people constantly change 
[15]. 
 
8) For the medical incidents, as we go into deep space, 
despite all countermeasures, we can provide the aid 
of an on-site medical doctor with experience on 
major surgeries that would be beneficial for the 
survival of the crew [16]. 
 
9) Leadership skills are important to help with quick 
and smooth adaptation to the new environment, and 
to ensure a successful mission.  The selected crew 
must have demonstrated leadership skills to be able 
to embrace change, make decisions, motivate the rest 
of the crew, be open to different ideas, and be fair.  
Leadership mainly helps with the psychological 
health of the crew living together for an extended 
period of time and promotes healthy work and 
life/survival performance [16]. 
 
10) The designer’s role in view of the full system life-
cycle now also includes that of an observer and 
analyst of actual working practices of human 
operators, adding to efforts by researchers in 
anthropology, ethnography and human-computer 
interaction. “The aim is to understand both user 
requirements and organizational pre-requisites for 
design and operations, in order to intervene in 
systems in the middle of their life cycle or feed into 
requirements generation and development of future 
systems” [17]. 
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II.V. General Recommendations for Significant 
Incidents Tool 
 
The Significant Incidents Tool provides a great 
platform to find information about loss of crew, crew 
injury, loss of vehicle or mission, and related or 
recurring events in the history of human spaceflight.   It 
is understood that this is a continuous work in progress 
tool, and we would like to contribute with some 
recommended updates to the tool. 
 
1) Although this study excluded EVA significant 
incidents because of its maintenance in a separate 
tool, it was noted that the list of incidents listed in 
that chart is missing the information from a recent 
close call during EVA 23, with EVA 35 as a related 
event.  A separate tab called “To add – EVA 23” was 
added providing a summary of the findings for EVA 
23 that can be used in the Significant Incidents tool, 
along with references.  Refer to Appendix C for a 
description and summary of findings of this 
dangerous EVA incident. 
 
2) Add legend for incidents that do not have colored 
boxes, like close calls. 
 
3) Move boxes of sources away from the bottom of the 
page (in presentation mode at the bottom left, these 
sources boxes interfere with presentation buttons to 
move forward and back, which do not allow one to 
click on them). 
 
4) Classification of "system" could be a little bit 
misleading, as we want to get people to acknowledge 
that "humans" are part of the system.  It is 
understood that in Human Spaceflight we typically 
call the technical groups “systems”; so if that is too 
big of an organizational/cultural change, it is ok to 
keep "systems" as a separate category.  But maybe 
perhaps "technical systems"? 
 
5) Consider changing "Human Error" classification to 
something else; anything done whether on the 
systems or by the operator can be attributed to 
human errors (e.g. humans also develop SW).  
Perhaps a good classification method instead of 
human error and systems would be "design-induced 
errors" and "operational errors". 
 
6) Consider adding a category for "organizational 
factors" to include decisions made at the top level 
that created a series of errors in the system (human, 
software, and hardware). 
 
7) Change "Lessons Learned" tab to "Lessons Learned 
Summary" and move it to the right side, as it is not a 
classification. 
 
8) Recommend dividing classifications in Main Page 
into three sections, as follows: 
 
Classification 1 – Incidents 
Keep classification for: 
o Loss of Crew 
o Crew Injuries 
o Related or Recurring Events 
Add: 
o Close Calls 
 
Classification 2 – Various 
Make another box or section (maybe by color) of 
second classification: 
o Space Vehicles 
o Country (not sure you need this but ok) 
o Systems (see recommendation 4, maybe 
rename to "technical system") 
 
Classification 3 - Human Factors 
Make another classification just for Human 
Factors Errors, or better yet for HSI.  Also, 
distinguish from other classifications by color of 
box.  Suggested Classification: 
o Human Factors Design-Induced Errors 
o Operational Errors/Factors 
o Design Errors/Factors 
o Organizational Errors/Factors 
 
9) Add keywords to each incident so it is easily 
searchable and related to other events. 
 
10) Add corresponding classification to each incident 
slide. 
 
11) Create another category for unmanned vehicles (e.g. 
Progress). 
 
12) Add number of crewmembers in each incident slide. 
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13) For incidents/failures during same mission, add a 
link in slides to jump to those events (e.g. Soyuz 1 
during orbit, Soyuz 1 during re-entry). 
 
14) Separate "related events" from "recurring events".  
Related events do not necessarily have to be 
highlighted.  If the intention is to show that same 
thing happened (in other words we did not learn our 
lesson) perhaps another category will need to be 
added. 
 
15) For each incident, it would be good to divide 
description in 3 parts: 
 Part 1: Brief description of incident 
 Part 2: Reason/causes/consequences 
Part 3: Solutions (methods in place resulting from 
incident investigations, if any) 
 
 
III. GOVERNING DOCUMENTS REVIEW 
 
Governing documents refer to specifications, 
standards, and all requirement documents mainly at the 
parent level that parts and subassemblies would be 
designed under.  Before getting into their review, it is 
important to learn some history for governing 
documents that have been used with respect to human 
systems.  The Shuttle and ISS programs used the 
NASA-STD-3000 Man Systems Integration Standards 
(1985).  This evolved into the currently used NASA-
STD-3001 Space Flight Human Systems Standards, 
which has two volumes. Volume 1 focuses on Crew 
Health, and Volume 2 focuses on Human Factors, 
Habitability & Environmental Health [6,18].  This 
governing document is supported by the NASA/SP-
2010-3407 Human Integration Design Handbook, which 
details different HSI requirements developed from 
lessons learned in past human spaceflight missions.  The 
process is required by NPR 8705.2B Human-Rating 
Requirements for Space Systems, and NPR 7120.11 
Health & Medical Technical Authority Implementation 
[7,19]. 
 
New human spaceflight programs use NASA-STD-
3001 to make a program-specific set of requirements.  
For example, ISS created the SSP 50005 ISSP Flight 
Crew Integration Requirements; and Constellation 
developed the CxP 70024 Human Systems Integration 
Requirements.  After the cancellation of Constellation, 
the latter document was updated with a new version that 
corresponded to the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 
(MPCV) program [20].  
 
Orion has addressed human errors in the MPCV 
70024 Human Systems Integration Requirements 
(HSIR) [8].  The HSIR contains topics such as 
anthropometry, biomechanics, and strength; natural and 
induced environments; architecture, crew functions and 
interfaces; flight and ground maintenance; and 
extravehicular activity (EVA).  Human systems 
requirements that assess the design against measurable 
objective human performance ratings to prevent the 
occurrence of errors are included in HS7066 Crew 
Interface Usability, HS7080 Crew Cognitive Workload, 
and HS7003 Handling Qualities. 
 
The current Commercial Crew Program (CCP) has 
developed a Commercial Human Systems Integration 
Processes (CHSIP) document, which traces down to a 
reference document called Human Systems Integration 
Processes (HSIP).  Some of those processes include 
human error analysis, design for human physical 
characteristics, capabilities, and population variation, 
crew survivability, net habitable volume, and other 
requirements. 
 
One of the most important requirements applicable 
to our human error analysis is documented in HS7066 
and CTS335.   In order to verify that the spacecraft will 
not be susceptible to human error, crew interfaces have 
to be certified to “a maximum of 5% erroneous task 
steps per participant, where each erroneous task step is 
committed by 10% or fewer participants” [21,22].  
 
 
III.I. Have we learned our lesson? 
 
This part of the review closes the circle of the 
significant incidents analysis from a HSI perspective.  
Knowing what the incident was, what the primary cause 
or contributing factor was, and what could have been 
done to prevent the incident, we can verify if we 
actually learned our lesson and are taking the necessary 
steps to minimize human error at the operational level.  
Using the classification and analysis described in 
Section 4, several governing documents were reviewed 
to ensure that they incorporate requirements that protect 
against these incidents from occurring in the future.  
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This was done for those incidents that were classified as 
design-induced error and operational human error, 23 
out of 113. 
 
Appendix A shows the specific requirements that 
address a particular incident or close call.  In some 
cases, there is more than one requirement that addresses 
other parts of the incident causes, and those found are 
stated in each cell.  The last column, 
“Recommendations for Documents,” detail 
recommendations to either clarify or add to those 
requirements listed in the governing documents.  It was 
found that all of them have at least one requirement that 
address an incident.  However, as mentioned earlier, 
some incidents occurred due to several factors, and once 
they happened, other issues arose that also became 
issues.  Alternate solutions should be implemented in 
current designs for all of these cases.  After consulting 
with NASA subject matter experts, we found that some 
of those requirements are documented in parent 
requirement documents, or even lower level documents.  
There is also a NASA Lessons Learned Database for 
Human Spaceflight, where the incidents in these 
analyses could be found.  However, this site is currently 
under construction and a massive reorganization is 
currently in the works.  Hence, we have not used this 
database other than to check the incidents are also listed 
there.  Another source to check as future work is the 
NASA Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS), which is led by an Agency’s Mishap 
Program Working Group. 
 
Let us take the STS-3 close call as an example -- the 
pilot induced oscillation during de-rotation, where 
stronger than predicted winds contributed to the issue.  
The primary cause was human factors design -- the 
transition between autoland and manual was not fully 
evaluated in the control design.  This was related to the 
Human Factors Engineering, Training, and Operations 
Resources NASA HSI domains.  The requirements 
found in the documents are as follows: 
 
o NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2: 
10.6.1.5 Automation Levels (V210104), addresses 
minimal automation of manual control [6]. 
 
o SP-2010-3407 Handbook: 
10.10.2.4 Levels of Automation, addresses the 
necessity of manual control [7]. 
o MPCV 70024 HSIR: 
HS7004 Manual Control, and HS7063C Protection 
for Flight Actuated Critical Controls. 
HS7004 addresses manual control but does not 
specify that it is required when automation is used, 
as in the other documents [8]. 
 
o CCT-REQ-1130: 
Both 3.2.6.1 and 4.3.2.6.1 Manually Override 
Software, address manual override capability for 
automation systems [9]. 
 
These requirements are the most proximate to 
address the STS-3 incident, but there may be other 
requirements specified in top level documents.  For 
instance, NPR 8705.2B has a requirement related to 
transition between autoland and manual, and feedback 
status of automation and inhibits.  Some other 
requirements may be verified at lower level documents; 
for example, the HS7063C is called out and will be 
verified by analysis and demonstration in the 72242 
Orion Display Format Standards [23].  This may be the 
case for other incidents as well. 
 
IV. FINAL REMARKS 
 
Overall, from this analysis we conclude that most 
of the issues encountered in the significant incidents and 
close calls in human spaceflight are being covered by 
requirements in the governing documents.  NASA is 
doing its best to mitigate and minimize human error.  It 
would be useful to specify certain requirements 
addressing these significant incidents, and those are 
noted in the recommendations sections.  Discussions 
with the standards team within the Habitability and 
Human Factors Branch, the division, and among other 
organizations at the Johnson Space Center would be 
beneficial to ensure the lessons are covered somewhere 
in the process/procedures and there is a responsible 
group verifying those are addressed.  Addressing these 
possible risks earlier in the mission life cycle process, 
during requirements development, design, and 
manufacturing/testing phases, would contribute to 
having better error management and its minimization at 
the operational level. 
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